"...in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, and later as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, one of my major difficulties arose from the paucity of real high-class leaders. The First World War had unfortunately taken the cream of our manhood. Those that had fallen were the born leaders of men, in command of companies or battalions. It was always the best that fell by taking the lead. Those that we had lost as subalterns, captains and majors in the First World War were the very ones we were short of as colonels, brigadiers, and generals in the Second World War."
Alanbrooke, Notes On My Life, Ch 3.
He thought the best and the bravest had gone, leaving the second-raters, a view which seems to have been widely shared between and after the wars (in James Barlow's 1960 novel the Patriots, the hero, an Arnhem paratrooper, beats up a man for airing them, seeing it as a slight on his dead comrades).
Yet the Germans lost a lot of people in WW1, but still were the best fighting army in WW2, with excellent generals too. A good job Hitler kept over-ruling them.
Did they lose fewer young officers in WW1 than we did ? Did their juniors not 'lead from the front' ? Or was the WW2 performance down to the generally-admitted high standards of competence and (especially) initiative of German NCOs ? In other words, why did the WW1 slaughter seem to harm us more than them ? Or were the same theories about the consequences of the lost leaders aired in Germany too ?
58 comments:
I don't know what the figures are but I suppose it is possible the Germans lost proportionally less officers than the British.
British officers wore jodhpurs, making them easy to distinguish from rankers, sillhouetted against a skyline.
I vaguely remember reading a remark by a German officer about British officers deliberately doing the most dangerous tasks (e.g. wire cutting) themselves while the Germans would,as a matter of course, order a more expendable man to do such a job.
As I understand it, the western front was more lethal on the British/French side than the German side.
The Germans chose the trench lines, and so held higher ground. That meant that trench foot was much less of a problem. They had sniper rifles and sights while the British Army still thought that sniping was unsporting. German trenches used counter-sniping techniques while British trench maintained patted-down edges, to aid the long kill. Of particular danger to the officer corps as anonymous 1 above says was that the officers could be distinguished by the cut of the uniform trousers.
Slowjoe
I don't know whether the Germans had more or fewer human waves, but no trench-foot + significant
Oh, and the German staff colleges were probably superior, as well.
Slowjoe
In addition, with its Prussian heritage, Germany was a far more naturally militarised society. Men took to the duties and disciplines of soldiering far more readily than the citizens army of the UK: the execution of c.30,000 men by the Germans for various forms of what they called cowardice or desertion would never have been possible in a British army and undoubtedly added to their fighting ability and aggression, as it also did to the Soviets.
And yes, their non-commissioned officers were, on average, significantly better than ours.
I remember reading somewhere, maybe "Mein Kampf" but I suspect more either "Hitlers table talk" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hitler's_Table_Talk ) or Goebbels diaries, where he (Hitler) voiced a similar opinion about the German army.
"The best of German soldiery we left back in the battle fields of France" or something similar.
Hmmm!?
The standard narrative is that in WWI we were lions led by donkeys, (in the words of Alan Clark (attributed to General Hoffman)). Alternatively, Liddell Hart thought that most generals were incompetent. In Lloyd George' memoirs he is uncomplimentary. Popular culture reinforces this (Oh What A Lovely War!, Black Adder IV et al).
Strangely, these terrible leaders actually won the war
Regarding deaths amongst junior officer I think there' several factors.
First of all, the mortality rate for junior officers was definitely higher. One in 7 British officers were killed (Gordon Corrigan). Eton lost 1 in 5 of those who served. Compare with the following overall rates:
pop mobilised killed %
G 60.3m 13.25m 1.95m 14.7%
F 39m 8.50m 1.391m 16.4%
UK 45.75m 8.375m .702m 8.4%
[Incidentally, this isn't unusual. Think of Nelson at Trafalgar. Mortality amongst the officers on deck was far higher than amongst the ordinary seamen]
I don't have the equivalent German Officer mortality but given the German casualty rate was twice our own it is inconceivable that they didn't lose an even larger a proportion of their own officers.
A second factor is that in the army in 1914 was minute. We needed to train a mass army but the people who would lead it were already in demand in France. It's worth pointing out here that the mortality rate of the BEF was extremely high in the first months of the war. We were obliged to bring back retirees and second raters in order to train the New Army. It's also fair to say that the promotion rate amongst officers was far higher in wartime. Consequently it was high probable that people with less experience found themselves in command. Would this have had any effect on junior officer deaths. Would an experienced officer have felt obliged to lead by example?
Not only did we have to fight prematurely, we had, as an ally, to fight at times or places that were not of our choosing. eg. Somme to relieve Verdun.
One of the anons mentions differences in the German army. I do recall reading that in the German army, each man was trained to do his own role and the position above him. The value of that comes from peacetime. It means that an army can expand quickly (as the German Army did prior to WWII) but it also gives a tactical advantage battle situations.
Can I recommend Mud Blood and Poppycock (Gordon Corrigan) which meticulously dissects some of these issues.
This may be useful;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_casualties
Allied forces lost 5,711,696 from 19 countries involved. Of which 1,811,000 were Russian, 1,397,800 were French, which was more than the entire British empire ost, at 1,114,914. (So may be you will all remember that NEXT time you make jokes about the French being cowards and "surrender monkeys!)
Central powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Austria and Turkey) lost 4,010,241. Of which 58% were German.
But that was on all fronts.
The French are cowardly pigs, the germans are evil. Only Russian and British men are true natural warriors of honour and fury.
(So may be you will all remember that NEXT time you make jokes about the French being cowards and "surrender monkeys!)
Ha!
Recent sabre rattling by the Argentinians seemed to encourage vast numbers of our own tofu eating surrender monkeys, who it seemed couldn't wait to come out of the woodwork and wave the white flag at the first opportunity.
The Guardian's CIF seemed to be full of them, or perhaps the steam coming from my ears obscured my vision and made it seem there were more than there actually were.
Personally, I don't doubt the Frogs or say, the Italians can put up a good fight if they want to. This is of the nature of football chanting isn't it - or do people really believe this stuff?
The British Army has a habit of re-fighting the last war, and that was the problem at the start of WWII until Montgomery took over.
Your notion that Germany had better leaders in WWII is a false one in any case. If that were true Germany would have had a long range bomber to match the Lancaster before the war started (its actions over Guernica suggested it must surely have seen the benefit of having one in any war where Britain was likely to play a part). Its failure to defeat the Russians in the East coupled with an insistency to continue with a brutal war of attrition that killed millions also must call into question their leadership qualities.
Fact is that Germany did well in WWII whilst its enemies were in disarray - France fell because most of its own citizens had come to feel it wasn't a country worth fighting for, a fact that took its British allies completely by surprise.
WWI history is clouded by the need by the radical left historians to paint it as a kind of class warfare (of which "oh what a lovely war" is a pathetic reminder). Fact is a lot of the upper crust got themselves killed in the early part of the war due to leading from the front, then there was a change in plan as they ran out of the officer class. Whether you believe that killing the young upper crust meant that Britain was left almost undefended due to having no upper crust offices would only be reasonable if you were to assume that the lower orders are entirely incapable of leadership - a popular belief in 1918 perhaps but not today I hope.
"France fell because most of its own citizens had come to feel it wasn't a country worth fighting for"
Oh dear. That has an awful contemporary resonance ...
"France fell because most of its own citizens had come to feel it wasn't a country worth fighting for"
I read on the internet somewhere (it may even have been here) that someone has looked into this and written a book on it blaming French teachers between the wars for filling the young French kids heads with pacifism, internationalism and other isms that rather sapped their fighting spirit.
Your notion that Germany had better leaders in WWII is a false one in any case. If that were true Germany would have had a long range bomber to match the Lancaster before the war started
Nonsense
Leaving aside the fact that we didn't started the war with the Lancaster either.
Britain and the US were wedded to a Strategic Bomber doctrine. Both assumed that bombers alone would win the war. The London Blitz and Coventry proved that morale couldn't be broken and that if anything resolve was increased. Apart from one quote from Speer about the effects of Hamburg (a freak result) there is little evidence it was having any different effect on the Germans.
On the contrary, Germany started the war with an air force dedicated to a tactical role. That was a critical factor in the success of Blitzkrieg. They went wrong in two ways
1. Production wasn't ramped up to maximum until late in the war. Even during the Battle of Britain, we were building more fighters than they were.
2. They diverted what resources were available into silly weapons like the V1 and V2 rather than mass producing what worked. They had the advantage of the first jet fighter but blew it by demanding it carried a paltry bomb load.
Actually, the leadership displayed by lower ranked officers in WW2 was far higher than in WW1. The Great War had exposed the leadership system of the British army terribly - officers bought their commissions and very few were either skilled or experienced. Just wealthy.
The inter war years saw a substantial change in British Army officer policy with emphasis put on retaining experienced NCO's through field commissions and an opening out of the candidacy for officer school.
However, it is true that few of those who came through that system between the wars had reached the rank of colonel - let alone brigadier or general. It really wouldn't have made much difference if many of those who were mown down on the Somme and Ypres had survived to become senior officers by WW2 - the tactics were still rooted in WW1 and based on infantry not armour.
The success of the German army in WW2 was in part due to the prominence they gave their NCO class. They were well used to operating without officer guidance and on their own intitiative and they were very well trained. Following the invasion of Normandy, German soldiers were amazed at the way British attacks lost momentum with the loss of an officer - the British chain of command was just too inflexible.
The Yanks, on the other hand, were far more tenacious as they had a similar set up to the Germans (but obviously less experienced) with NCOs taking command and rapid battlefield commissions.
The Russians just had sheer weight of numbers and materiel advantage.
Just to chime in on a few of the points already made...
Lost leaders: For most of WW1, in the west anyway, the Germans were on the defensive. The British & French were attacking. Therefore their casualties were relitively higher than the Germans. And leading the attackers, junior infantry officers would have suffered heavily compared to German officers.
The Germans were generally less disposed to attack or 'aggresively patrol' both on the ground and in the air. The British were forever probing the German lines with patrols, often led by junior officers, and of course lots of them died. The Germans were much less inclined to this activity.
AS mentioned, the Germans chose their ground, where to entrench, more carefully. At least once they made a significant withdrawal to better lines of defence. The allies otoh were always tring to attack to gain better positions.
The same can be seen in the air war. The Germans sent out formations for specific objectives, attacking targets, recon. The British were forever patrolling and invading German airspace for no tactical or strategic reason at all. Just as on the ground this lead to constant attrition for little result.
(This lesson was still unlearned after the Battle of Britain in WW2. As soon as the battle was won the RAF begain constant aggressive patrols over France. Result: mounting losses of planes and aircrew killed and captured).
In one sense, to win in the west in WW1, the Germans only had sit where they were. Holding a big slice of France and most of Belgium. They didnt need to attack, the allies otoh had to for political reasons even if not for tactical ones.
Lancasters, strategic bombers: It seems clear now that much of our investment in strategic bombers had little payoff but the political/miltary establishment were so enthralled with the concept that no trivial reality would divert them. The Battle of Britain should have showed what the defence could achieve yet the RAF continued to plan and develop as if the battle had never happened.
Of course the Germans really could have used a strategic bomber force. Im not denying its use a military tool, but it became a British (and American) fetish, pursued way beyond any practical payoff.
The blitz didn't have any effect on morale?
The well to-do went to live in the country. That is why my parents could rent a house in thornton heath ( but were evicted after the war).
And do you think being an evacuee was an ok thing?
You would have to be thick for it not to have an effect on your morale.
You would have to be thick for it not to have an effect on your morale.
Before and during the war, mass bombing was supposed to destroy the morale of the population, the victims would be psychologically incapable of carrying on - plus all the physical damage to them and the infrastructure.
No-one is saying that eveyone emerged happy & smiling from the blitz. But thats a long way from total psychological collapse of a non-trivial percentage of the population.
Re the dress of WW1 British officers.
I think the officers tended to dress down, at the front, as the war progressed. Basically wearing the same as the lads, carrying rifles instead of pistols so as not to mark themselves out.
Britain and the US were wedded to a Strategic Bomber doctrine. Both assumed that bombers alone would win the war. The London Blitz and Coventry proved that morale couldn't be broken and that if anything resolve was increased. Apart from one quote from Speer about the effects of Hamburg (a freak result) there is little evidence it was having any different effect on the Germans.
Corelli Barnett has also argued that the fetish for the strategic bombing campaign may have lengthened the war. Vital resources were diverted towards the bomber force at the expense of the Fleet Air Arm. Britain came very close to being defeated through submarine warfare because of a shortage of suitable aircraft to patrol the Atlantic. This is to take nothing away from the heroes that flew the raids on Germany, but my feeling with hindsight is that resources were too heavily weighted towards bomber command.
If no strategic bombing what instead?
And how would stalin have felt about it?
the west needed him.
As for loss of genetic material compare the post ww2 progress of germany and the uk.
An interesting thread.
I would suggest, tentatively, that the main difference between German and British armies was the fact that in Prussia/Germany the army was part and parcel of every man's life. For geopolitical reasons to do with the flat, indefensible nature of North Germany, in the 19th century they quickly took to the idea of the nation in arms, that is, mass armies based on 3 or more years national service followed by reserve service. In addition, the reforms led by von Scharnhorst, which resulted in the establishment of a War Acadamy in which the students were chosen by exam not by birth produced a stream of extremely well-trained staff officers who really understood the business of war.
The social history of Britain was, of course, the exact opposite. Since Cromwell standing armies were viewed with suspicion and kept to a minimum. Even when the empire demanded larger numbers they were quickly shipped overseas where they mostly engaged in garrison duties. Investement in the TA was minimal until just a few years before 1914. Entry and advancement in the Army officer class was severely limited by money and breeding.
The opposite was true of our navy in which entry to the officer class was more or less open to all but did require men (or boys) with sufficent brains to understand the mathematics of navigation and gunnery. Also, unlike the army where rich or connected officers could absent themselves from their regiments if postings were not to their liking, naval officers would spend years at sea honing their skills.
In essence, the British never took soldiering seriously and I'm not convinced that very much has changed even today.
Stan said...
The Yanks, on the other hand, were far more tenacious as they had a similar set up to the Germans (but obviously less experienced) with NCOs taking command and rapid battlefield commissions.
That is because the U.S army was born of the Prussian army, when they "borrowed" von Steuben to develop and train their "minute men" into a real army, in the 1770s-1780s.
In fact he is credited as enabling the U.S to win the war of independence.
His statue still stands today opposite the U.S embassy here, in Berlin. (The old U.S embassy now.)
Although in the time between 1780 and 1942-5, the tactics had changed slightly, learning from the study of the Franco-Prussian, and the Crimean wars among others, the basics, and especialy the command structure and culture stayed VERY similar, if not 100% the same.
As to strategic bombing. Schweinfurt ball bearing plant raids. The larget loss of U.S airmen in one raid in the whole war, and the factory was back to 99% production less than a week later. Junkers plant in Berlin. Again heavy aircraft and crew losses. Place nearly flatened. Back in production THE NEXT DAY! Mohne and Eder dams, the purpose being to starve factories of electricity. No noticeable effect on production.
(I have references, but really any book that deals with the bombing campaign will show this).
If no strategic bombing what instead?
And how would stalin have felt about it?
the west needed him.
As said, strategic bombing was a fetish, often incapable of accuracy it just ended up as mass killing and destruction of non-military buildings.
I think we sold our strategic bombing campaign to Stalin as our second front because we wanted to bomb anyway. We werent doing it to please him but ourselves.
Your comment implies we somehow had to keep Stalin happy.
Why in reality would we need to do that?
The Germans were occupying a large portion of the best bits of the USSR, Stalin had all the incentive he needed to keep fighting. Sure we helped him to fight but what he thought about that isnt that important.
I was raised on the idea of WW2 as a good war, one we had to fight. I must confess Im a lot less convinced by that now. What good has it done us? We sided with Stalin, a far greater tyrant than Hitler, what good did that do in the end?
Some people read too many books and do too little thinking.
The German's needed a long-range bomber because they needed to destroy British ports in the north to isolate Britain from its sources of supply. Germany didn't have a development plan for such a long range bomber, so it never had a suitable aircraft at any point in the war. This was a serious failure in German leadership - they had no real plan to neutralise Germany's obvious enemy on the doorstep.
The development of the Lancaster was the culmination of a long-term development programme that brought a bomber capable of hitting any part of Germany into service in 1942, not long after the bombing capaign itself had started.
Anybody who has been to Dresden will understand that bomber command would indeed have won the war for Britain had it not been for the fact that Russian and US involvement on the ground brought it to an end somewhat sooner. The dubious moral nature of the bombing campaign has seen it fall foul of "progressive" historians with the benefit of hindsight, and thus discredited.
Note that the Russians also used aerial bombing, specifically against Berlin.
I was raised on the idea of WW2 as a good war, one we had to fight.
Me too.
I must confess Im a lot less convinced by that now.
Me too.
What good has it done us?
I can't see anything. It looks like the real losers of WWII were Britain, and maybe France, The Netherlands, Belgium and eventually Portugal. But certainly Britain.
The whole world is so much better now. Oh yes.
We sided with Stalin, a far greater tyrant than Hitler, what good did that do in the end?
Absolutely none. A total disaster.
I haven't read Pat Buchanan's 'Churchill, Hitler, and "The Unnecessary War": How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World.' but its certainly on my hit list.
Anonymous said...10:46 AM
Some people read too many books and do too little thinking.
Some people think too much without any foundation in facts.
The German's needed a long-range bomber because they needed to destroy British ports in the north to isolate Britain from its sources of supply.
Considering we bombed Belfast, we did not do TOO badly with the bombers we had.
Plus, the "neutralisation of British sea power" was meant to be a job for the Reichsmarine. Then Hitler bowed to, considering Hitlers march into Russia, correct, pressure from the army and, particularly, from Göring, and diverted the money to them, instead of building the 500 U-Boots that Dönitz needed to win the battle of the Atlantic, and the fuel and ammunition needed for the surface fleet.
The problem with bombers and shipping/eyes and ears for the U-Boots was not one of range or quality of the planes, but Görings insistance that any one but him had command over them. It was this denial of recources to Raeder, and later Dönitz, that was the problem for the Navy, NOT the fact that the aircraft types were wrong.
NOT the fact that the aircraft types were wrong.
Did the Germans have a decent naval bomber?
I might be wrong, but I don't think they did, and good naval bombers would have been very useful when fighting Britain in WWII.
Foke Wulf Condor. But still the same problem with "Everything that flies belongs to me" Göring.
Here is an example of the problems the Luftwaffe (Göring) caused. This was to be used as an anti shipping bomber, but;
He 177 GriefCountry Germany
Manufacturer Heinkel Flugzeugwerke
Primary Role Horizontal Bomber
Maiden Flight 19 November 1939
The He 177 Greif ("Griffin") were long-range heavy bombers of the German Luftwaffe. An unusual feature in the design called for two engines in each nacelle driving a single propeller, which was a result of the German Air Ministry's demand (Göring was air minister as well!) that He 177 bombers should be capable of dive bombing, which was impossible with four propellers. This unique engine configuration, unfortunately, increased the chance of accidental fire as any oil leakage would drip onto the hot exhaust manifolds on the two middle cylinder banks. The frequent fires with earlier variants of the He 177 design led to the nickname Reichsfeuerzeug, "the lighter of the Reich"; the problem with fires was never totally resolved in later variants. Because of the dive bombing requirement, the wing and structure were strengthened beyond a typical horizontal bomber design called for, therefore He 177 bombers' speed and bomb load to suffer. In the end, they were only able to achieve shallow dive attacks, so most were used as a horizontal bomber only. When production ended due to the Fighter Emergency Program of 1944 which called for a halt in all bomber production in favor of fighters, 1,184 aircraft were built.
A small number of true four-engined variants were built under the designation He 277, but because they were not officially sanctioned by the Luftwaffe, the variant never entered production.
SPECIFICATIONS
A-5Machinery Two Daimler-Benz DB 610 (twin DB 605) 24-cylinder liquid-cooled engines, rated at 2,950hp each
Armament 1x7.92mm nose MG 81J, 1x20mm ventral MG 151, 2x13mm forward dorsal MG 131, 1x13mm aft MG 131, 1x20mm tail MG 151, up to 7,200kg of bombs or two mines, missiles, or torpedoes
Span 9.99 m
Length 9.99 m
Height 6.70 m
Wing Area 99.99 m²
Weight, Empty 16,800 kg
Weight, Loaded 31,000 kg
Speed, Maximum 472 km/h
Service Ceiling 7,080 m
Range, Normal 1,540 km
Range, Maximum 5,600 km
http://ww2db.com/aircraft_spec.php?aircraft_model_id=120
Note 1939 as first fly date. And I would say 5,600 Kilometer was pretty long range. Although usefull range is only half of that, IF they wanted to get back for tiffin.
I was just looking up the Italian WWII naval bombing record, which was quite impressive at times:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_SM.79
The above link has this paragraph:
The 25 Italian bomber wings were unable to disturb the British forces, as the Battle of Punta Stilo demonstrated. Almost all of the major British ships lost were due to U-Boat attacks, with the damaging of HMS Warspite, and the sinking of HMS Barham and Ark Royal.
Which seems to support the view that the resources would have been better spent on U-Boats than on aircraft anyway.
A number of comments suggest that strategic bombing was overdone or indeed pointless (when carried out by the Allies). This is contradicted by the post-war testimony of the Germans themselves. At the very least, large quantities of materiel were diverted to the defence of Germany (over 50,000 anti-aircraft guns, for instance). The ability of the German airforce to function on the Russian front was greatly diminished, as was its ability to impede the Normandy landings, as so many pilots died in fighting over Germany itself. In January 1945, Speer estimated that around one third of German production for 1944 had fallen victim to the raids. Even if this estimate was somewhat self-serving, it flies in the face of reason to suggest that making much of the population homeless and forcing constant dispersal of production could have had little or no effect on the ability to wage a war which had become so reliant on plentiful machinery. I would suggest that people ask themselves what effect a fraction of that bombing would have on modern Britain's ability to function to see the foolishness of such a view.
But the U-Boots were desperately short of "Eyes and ears", which was mainly what the Condprs were used for. Both to detect dangers to the wolf pack, and for target finding.
MOST of a U-Boots patrol was wasted on hunting vast areas of empty sea. A better working between Luftwaffe, or even as was suggested at one point, for the navy to have it's own air power, (Which is what lead Göring to his statement "All that flies belongs to me"), would have increased the efficiency and safety of the U-Boot fleet an untold number.
"Considering we bombed Belfast, we did not do TOO badly with the bombers we had."
During the course of the war 30,000 killed in London, 1000 in Belfast and 4000 in Liverpool. The further away the smaller the casualties. Having a range of thousands of miles isn't much help if you can't actually carry bombs to your target.
From wikipedia:-
"The Heinkel He 177 Greif (Griffin) was a long-range bomber of the Luftwaffe. This troubled aircraft was the only heavy bomber built in large numbers by Germany during World War II. Luftwaffe aircrew nicknamed it the Luftwaffenfeuerzeug (Luftwaffe's lighter) or the "Flaming Coffin" due to serious engine problems on the initial versions of the aircraft.[2] When these problems were later rectified the type was successful, but could not be deployed in numbers due to Germany's deteriorating situation in the war."
@John Bull: "Which seems to support the view that the resources would have been better spent on U-Boats than on aircraft anyway."
You are assuming that the aircraft should have been used against moving ships, rather than on the docks at Liverpool, Clydeside, Belfast etc. The Germans did indeed attack these docks but failed to have much of an impact due to lack of heavy long-range bombers capable of dropping large payloads of bombs on distant targets then returning to the continent. As a result Germany was not able to strangle Britain into submission during WWII and Britain was effectively used as a permanent safe base from which to attack Germany.
What the German's SHOULD have done to defeat Britain was what the US did against Japan, with sustained aerial bombardment of major cities, mining of shipping lanes and destruction of major ports. Failing to do this ensured that German defeat was a matter of time and commitment.
The Germans did indeed attack these docks but failed to have much of an impact due to lack of heavy long-range bombers capable of dropping large payloads of bombs on distant targets then returning to the continent.
Hmmnn...
We had heavy long range bombers.
But when we needed to knock out the dry dock at St Nazaire, we chose to ram an obsolete destroyer with a bomb on board into the dock and lose at the same time 589 highly trained Royal Marine Commandos - not to mention the RN personnel who didn't come back.
Why?
We could have bombed it from a great height.
French casualties?
That didn't seem to bother us too much at various other times.
Perhaps aerial bombardment wasn't all that effective?
Oops
My figures are a bit dodgy:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_Nazaire_Raid
Out of 611 Royal Commandos who entered the St. Nazaire harbour, only about 200 or more succeeded in landing at the docks. All but 27 of the commandos that landed were either killed or captured: 22 escaped back to Britain in the Motor Torpedo Boats and five escaped to the Spanish border.
The Condor, though an excellent aircraft in most respects, had a relatively small bomb load for it's size (around 4000 lbs compared to the Lancaster's 14000 lbs). Had it been produced in sufficient numbers then it may have proved successful as a strategic bomber - the B17, for instance, was similarly endowed with a limited bombload, but there were soooooo many of them.
I'm not really convinced by the Prussian argument for the US having a similar reliance on the NCO class to the Wehrmacht in WW2 - the tactics and weapons were just so different by then - but there may be something in it regarding the ethos of the respective armies.
As for who benefitted from WW2 - well German and Japanese cars fill our roads and their electronic goods proliferate in our homes. We rely on Russian gas and oil and French electricty.
We might have been on the winning side in 1945, but we lost out big time in the ensuing peace. Would anything have been different had we stayed out? Well - Germany and Russia would have slugged away at each other until one or other of them developed the nuclear bomb. This would most certainly have been Germany who would then have obliterated the Soviet Union without a moment's hesitation. The Soviet Union would have been defeated and the rest of us would have been held to ransom. Britain would become the western outpost of a "European Union" dominated by Germany who dictate our laws and regulations from some remote bureucracy with a nominally elected "parliament". Our roads would be full of cars from Germany and their allies (Japan and Italy) and their consumer goods would proliferate in our homes.
Actually, this all sounds remarkably familair - perhaps we didn't win the war after all.
Obviously this thread is essentially about post war British economic failure relative to Germany.
Whilst the slaughter of the brightest and best, WWI officers and Bomber Command aircrew, was grievous this consideration must be swept away by total German losses - which enormously exceeded ours.
Correlli Barnett's "Desert Generals" told a few home truths. The British in the desert were hidebound and inflexible; infantry and tanks were too compartmentalised - the regimental system, whilst a source of great strength in one way, was a great hindrance in another.
German Panzer divisions were flexible all-arms formations which combined armour, infantry and artillery superbly. Anti-tank weapons were used offensively whereas in the British army they were thought of as purely defensive weapons. It was a different mentality. Sometimes the British tanks would be lured onto a screen of German anti-tank guns and wiped out in a mad charge. Then the British infantry would be mopped up by mixed German formations. It wasn't very clever.
According to Barnett Monty was hopelessly hidebound in the desert and his plan to break the Axis defences at Alamein - which rigidly compartmentalised tanks and infantry - would have failed had he not enjoyed such massive material superiority.
War is the ultimate test of a society, Barnett thought that the faults revealed during WW2 replicated themselves in post war economic performance. He argues structural, class division faults I think. Certainly if one looks at the likes of Cameron, Osborne, Boris Johnson they evidently spring from a class of rentier parasites.
Having said that Peter Ackroyd in "Albion" gives a list of several hundred painters, composers, writer, architects he considers of great merit - starts with Bede.
OK - it's subjective, but there are few born between the wars - and none post45 when I had been led to suppose that we had been so greatly enriched.
Perhaps something intangible and precious did die on the 1st July 1916
Stan
"Following the invasion of Normandy, German soldiers were amazed at the way British attacks lost momentum with the loss of an officer - the British chain of command was just too inflexible.
The Yanks, on the other hand, were far more tenacious as they had a similar set up to the Germans (but obviously less experienced) with NCOs taking command and rapid battlefield commissions."
This is dubious - the best German formations were on the British front, 6 out of 8 Panzer divisions; the British army faced most of the 88s, Tigers and Panthers, Nebelwurfers. It was a slugging match in which it was the sheer weight of material that wore down the Germans thereby enabling the Americans to breakthrough eventually. The British army did what was necessary and Montgomery deserves great credit for the way he handled affairs at the minimum cost that was possible.
Some commentators have written of the poor performance of some US infantry divisions. When the Americans did break out at St Lo they faced nothing like the strong defences which confronted the British during their earlier offensives. The Americans were able to take advantage of the attrition that had occured on the British front. Panzer Lehr for instance was a shadow of the formation that went into Normandy earlier
JB
"Perhaps aerial bombardment wasn't all that effective?"
RAF Bomber Command operations were ludicrously ineffective during the period 1939-41 - virtually no thought had been given to the necessity of night flight, there were consequently no electronic aids to navigation and bombing was often done on "dead reckoning" ie miles away away from the target. The charge/weight ratio of RAF bombs was pathetic.
It was not until 1943 that Bomber Command could be considered an effective force; however area bombing was instituted because only a target the size of a town could usually be hit - often not then - not because of its intrinsic "merits". Indeed one would be justified in calling it aerial terrorism, that is how Churchil described Dresden
Stan
"Actually, this all sounds remarkably familair - perhaps we didn't win the war after all."
AJP Taylor said that in order to defeat Hitler Britain gave up its future - or to be more accurate a small group of decision makers did so, as per usual
It would have been logical, and easy, to have seen off Adolph and Musso in 1935.
By 1939 Chamberlain's rubber cheque "guarantee" to the Poles was sheer folly.
When the Germans had cornered the BEF at Dunkirk it would have been logical to accept Hitler's - very favourable - terms at that point.
It was a desperate risk to go on at that point and, 70 years later, the more we slide inexorably down the tube the less justifiable it seems.
Perhaps the Germans would have got bogged down in Russia, Hitler wouldn't have lasted for ever. Britain and America might have dictated terms. Then there is the Holocaust to consider, Wannsee took place after the US had entered the war and Hitler was effectively surrounded, and had been defeated in front of Moscow. Perhaps if Britain and the US had been neutral at that point it might have been possible to negociate an escape for many of those unfortunates who perished so horribly.
It is appropriate to question all this on rational grounds for it is very clear that the left's unnuanced view of the war as an "anti-fascist struggle" - where does that leave traditional balance of power considerations? - has very gravely damaged us - because if anybody suggests it isn't that wonderful to become a minority in our own country they immediately start screaming "racist, fascist, nazi".
Certainly history serves the present - which is why the left major on slavery, colonialism and the nazis - but the more dire our situation becomes the more history will be re-evaluated in a direction not to the liberal-left's liking.
I wish to god some of our history would be taught, then we could consider present events in the light of our own interests.
Warts and all, warts and all
The FW200 Condor was a beautiful looking plane - a former airliner -but not up to the rigors placed upon it over the Atlantic.
We werent winners in 1945 but on the winning side.
The French are jammy buggers, they also got to count as a major power in 1945 while having done little actual fighting. And lets not forget half of France was effectively outside the war 1940-44.
Strangely, these terrible leaders actually won the war
I know there is a move to rehabilitate the British High Command of WW1 but I have this image of British infantry walking with arms aport on the morning of 1.7.16. This they were ordered to do. How many lives could have been saved (and how much more successful the day)if some intelligent thought had been applied to infantry tactics. The previous two years might well not have occurred.
AgainsTTheWall said...
Strangely, these terrible leaders actually won the war
I know there is a move to rehabilitate the British High Command of WW1 but I have this image of British infantry walking with arms aport on the morning of 1.7.16.
It is not as if they had not learned their mistakes.
Even as early as Waterloo, if not earlier, the Brits made great use of Light infantry, and what we would probably call "Skirmish tacticts".
They KNEW the system. But to return to the "old method" of a large, massed, front of troops attacking the enemy, with 10 rounds, hope and a bayonet, was inexcusable. ESPECIALLY considering the known efficiency of machine gun posts against a massed body of soldiers at that time.
Having said that, does any one have any views on whether they would not make the same "trench warfare" mistake again, given that two equaly matched forces ever get the chance to face each other again (Given that air power had neutralised each other out)?
"It is not as if they had not learned their mistakes."
Well they did. They invented the tank and so ended the war.
The Germans however did not learn from their mistakes in WWI and repeated them on the Eastern front throwing twice as many lives into a brutal war of attrition that achieved precisely nothing, other than to allow the Russians to advance into the power vacuum created by sustained aerial bombing whilst many of Germany's potential defenders found themselves stranded in foreign countries.
The German army in WWII was a bit of a one-trick pony. It had Blitzkrieg, and if that didn't work it had "dig in" and plenty of willing canon fodder. Germany never had any great leaders - it's just that German's are easily led. I don't think there is any other nation on earth that would have embarked on an offensive like the Eastern front and taken such losses while its home territory was blown to bits.
"Obviously this thread is essentially about post war British economic failure relative to Germany."
Caused by the fact that Britain had a massive debt after WWII whereas not only did Germany have its debts written off but it actually was subsidised by the British after WWII (which was one of the reasons for bread rationing after the war in Britain). Finally, with Germany being in the front-line against communism and the shining star of the capitalist West to compare against its Communist neighbour, it was propped up by the US and Britain during the Cold War with vast subsidies being pumped into the German economy.
But don't worry, over the last 15 years I have seen a rather dramatic slide in German fortunes and pretty soon they will be in the same gutter as the rest of Europe.
ATTW
"I know there is a move to rehabilitate the British High Command of WW1 but I have this image of British infantry walking with arms aport on the morning of 1.7.16"
One wishes fervently that WWI had never happened - having said all that great credit is due to the British Army because, by the end, it was capable of defeating the Germans - the finest army on the planet.
During the final offensives on the Westen Front it was the British army that took the most prisoners and captured the most German artillery.
By then the Royal Artillery was able to shell it's way into any position, so it has been said. The earlier defects in the artillery had been sorted out and the infantry could advance behind creeping barrages - this was something of a science and I think that Alanbrooke made a name for himself here. The British combination of tanks, artillery and infantry was pretty revolutionary for the time - although of course it was the Germans who were to fully exploit it 20 odd years later.
The breaking of the Hindenburg Line was a major military triumph.
The British army had to convert itself from a colonial war fighting force to take on Europe's finest mass army, this was a catch up exercise and so it is hardly suprising that that disasters like Loos and July 1st 1916 happened - when the German wire was supposed to be cut by the barrage, but wasn't.
Because we are knackered now there is I think a tendency to overdo the historical faults, and not to treat history in a balanced way
But one cannot listen to the Banks of Green Willow" without a sense of deep sorrow. How disasterous were these European Civil Wars! The tragedy and the futility of it.
And even now we have this is pointless, tragic. criminal waste in the desperate hole that is Helmand.
"For what can war but endless war breed" - John Milton
Quite right too
War is the very last resort
Anon
"I don't think there is any other nation on earth that would have embarked on an offensive like the Eastern front and taken such losses while its home territory was blown to bits."
That was Hitler though
For contrast read "Lost Victories" by von Manstein
Hitler saw war as a matter of brute force; the triumph of the will. Manstein thought in terms of the military art where the fencer would take a pace back befire springing forward to deliver a decisive thrust
"The German army in WWII was a bit of a one-trick pony. It had Blitzkrieg, and if that didn't work it had "dig in" and plenty of willing canon fodder"
Blitzkrieg comprised a combined arms concentration of force at the decisive point. According to Correlli Barnett his hero, the very interesting Major-General Dorman-Smith, had predicted before the war that such a concentration could break through the British and French deployed in a conventional manner.
However one should surely not just think of the use of German Panzer forces in an offensive manner - "one trick pony".
After Adolph's howling Stalingrad mess it looked like the entire German southern wing stretching into the Caucasus would be cut off.
Manstein conceived of and executed his Operation Rochade(castling on the queen's side). He skillfully redeployed the army that Hitler had left hopelessly unbalanced, fended off clumsy Russian attacks and launched a devastating counter-attack at Kharkov.
It was the fencer, not the brute.
There we of course a number of such masterly exponents of the military art in the German army; Guderian, Rommel, Erhard Raus. An impt objective of German theorists was to avoid the terrible slaaughter of the western front and to overthrow an enemy with minimum casualties.
"Caused by the fact that Britain had a massive debt after WWII whereas not only did Germany have its debts written off but it actually was subsidised by the British after WWII (which was one of the reasons for bread rationing after the war in Britain)."
That does leave out Marshall Aid of course. For several years post-war hundreds of thousands of German prisoners were being used as serf labour on British farms; and apparently so in Eastern Europe as well.
The Germans are very remarkable, of that there is no doubt.
So the traditional balance of power approach which saw off the challenge of Imperial Spain and France didn't really work, because it left us so weakened.
"But don't worry, over the last 15 years I have seen a rather dramatic slide in German fortunes and pretty soon they will be in the same gutter as the rest of Europe."
cold comfort indeed
"Or was the WW2 performance down to the generally-admitted high standards of competence and (especially) initiative of German NCOs?"
I 'd have said that it was down to a thoroughly worked out theory of modern war, as I indicated above.
Barnett says that the pre-war British army, despite some far-seeing theorists, failed the intellectual test.
It was a hard enough job to get the cavalry to give up their horses, and apparently the RTR under the influence of Hobart became a "persecuted extremist sect". They thought that infantry was irrelevant and that wars would simply be won by tanks alone.
Even in 1944 the poor co-operation between different arms could produce bad results. Montgomery's Operation Goodwood was reminiscent of Ney's charges against Wellington's squares - though it has been pointed out by Hastings/Keegan that it was the crisis of infantry casulaties that perhaps dictated this unsound approach.
I think that there can be a fundamental rigidity in the British character - we see this with the idiots who bang on about free trade and free markets in spite of all the evidence that this has been as sensible as a cavalry charge against German 88s. Though of course it has enriched the "elite" so it is not all about stupidity - though a lot of it undoubtedly is.
We should not beat ourselves up too much perhaps - the French performance in 1914 and 1940, both based essentially upon outmoded theory, was completely crass; but it is evident that post-war their traditional dirigiste approach has served them well - they have a great car industry whilst we have got Sweet FA.
On the German NCO point whilst I think their success was down to sound and imaginative foundations Manstein for instance remarks that German soldiers were also trained to do more than was expected of them.
Apparently in the German army there was a considerable latitude given at lower command levels about how an objective was to be achieved.
But of course we mustn't forget that it was not all about initiative, many thousands of German soldiers were shot by their own side.
I agree that it was a bit unfair to describe the Wehrmacht as a one trick pony.
As for "Blitzkrieg" - essentially it's the same principle (shock and awe) used by the Allies in Iraq and Afghanistan - and just like the Nazis in WW2 they have discovered that it is very effective at defeating a regular army, but useless at paving the way for occupation.
Blitzkrieg is great if all you want to do is kick some other nations ass and get out again quick - but if you plan to hang around for any length of time after that you need something else. Most of all you need that nation and all its people to realise that they have been utterly defeated.
And that, incidentally, is where strategic bombing played such a crucial role. It might seem cruel and inhuman now, but it was necessary if we were to not just defeat Germany, but destroy Nazism as well.
Anonymous said...9:12 AM
The German army in WWII was a bit of a one-trick pony. It had Blitzkrieg, and if that didn't work it had "dig in" and plenty of willing canon fodder.
Interesting point. I wish I was still in touch with my Professor to disuss it.
Germany never had any great leaders -
Hmm. Although I would hesitate to call Hitler "great", under his "leadership" we DID manage to take a HEL of a lot of armies on before we started loosing.
I would point towards Guderian, Rommel, and von Manstein, for starters.
ALL were "great leaders". The irony is, that the "Stab in the back" that Hitler went on about, as being Germanys defeat in WWI, was EXACTLY what he did to the Generals, the army (Navy) in WWII. In HIS case it was by sheer incompitence rather than an actual political move.
it's just that German's are easily led.
Please tell that to my boss. He needs a bit of light entertainment.
A point about the thread in general. "Annonymous". ARE you the same "Ann on a mouse" that wrote earlier?, or have we got 4 or 5 of you?
It makes it damn difficult to carry a thread.
Whether through lazyness or cowardis, could you PLEASE, on ALL blogg sites, differentiate yourselves?
"Mickey bloody mouse" would do.
It was a hard enough job to get the cavalry to give up their horses
Yet the British army was the only fully motorized army in the world in 1939. The only one not using horses in any capacity.
Whilst most of us on this thread probably agree that the Anglo/American armies, made us as they were of citizen soldiers, did not fight with anything like the ruthless efficiency of the Germans, perhaps that was not completely a bad thing. Max Hastings sums up the thought towards the end of his book "Armageddon":
"If allied soldiers had possessed the energy, commitment and will for sacrifice of either German or Russian armies, they might have achieved a decisive breakthrough. But American and British soldiers were not panzergrenadiers. Socially and morally, we should be profoundly grateful that it was so. [...] To have achieved a swift victory, Eisenhower's soldiers would have needed to be different people. If American and British soldiers of 1944-5 had matched the military prowess and become imbued with the warrior ethos of Hitler's armies, it is unlikely that we should today hold the veterans of the Second World War in the just regard that we do. They fought as bravely and as well as any democracy could ask, if the values of civilisation were to be retained in their ranks. (My emphasis)
Let that be their truly honourable epitaph.
Furor
"it's just that German's are easily led.
Please tell that to my boss. He needs a bit of light entertainment."
This is a very interesting thread
The British were pleased to ascribe an inflexible doltishness to their enemies.
But in reality we were often far more rigid.
For instance compare the "finger four" fighter tactics employed by the Luftwaffe during the BOB to the idiotic "vics" flown by the RAF.
Churchill said that the Germans flew down a radio beam during the Blitz because they had no individual initiative - whereas the RAF scattered bombs more or less at random upon "dead reckoning".
It was bullshit then, and the inflexible target culture we have is bullshit now.
Anon
"Yet the British army was the only fully motorized army in the world in 1939. The only one not using horses in any capacity."
But it was the tip of the spear that counted
Stan
"As for "Blitzkrieg" - essentially it's the same principle (shock and awe) used by the Allies in Iraq and Afghanistan - and just like the Nazis in WW2 they have discovered that it is very effective at defeating a regular army, but useless at paving the way for occupation."
That was hardly the case with France in 1940.
The German operation was briliant.
Originally conceived by Manstein it was picked up by Hitler(who wobbled during its execution).
The German plan had been a 1914 re-run, an offensive through Belgium which the Allies expected and indeed rushed to meet.
However Manstein's masterly alternative, "Sickle Sweep", drew the French and British into Belgium before skewering them with a thrust through the Ardennes, forcing the Meuse and then a dash to the Channel.
Executed by Guderian and Rommel this was worthy of Alexander and Ceasar.
The French did indeed accept their total defeat
"And that, incidentally, is where strategic bombing played such a crucial role. It might seem cruel and inhuman now, but it was necessary if we were to not just defeat Germany, but destroy Nazism as well."
Does the means justify the ends? Perhaps it does where national survival is at stake. But one would hardly be human if one did not have the profoundest misgivings at such a terible aerial slaughter.
History is not set in stone. If the indigenous people of Europe are over-run and Islamified I would hardly anticipate that the huddling remnants will have an unequivocal view of WW2
Sgt Troy said...
"Caused by the fact that Britain had a massive debt after WWII whereas not only did Germany have its debts written off but it actually was subsidised by the British after WWII (which was one of the reasons for bread rationing after the war in Britain)."
10:10 AM
Sorry Sgt Troy, I can not quite figure out at this late hour, who you are quoting, but whomsoever it is.
RUBBISH"
Germany did NOT get it's debts "Written of" Nor were we "subsidised". We wre given LOANS. and We are STILL paying "reparations" from WWI!
"In the London conference regarding German debts (from WWI!) 28/02/52 to 08/08/52, it was decided that the interest on repayments of the loans that the Kaiser had taken out to pay for the war, i.e young anleihe 990 millionen DM, Dawes Anleihe 341 million DM, Kreuger Anleihe 200 million DM, would be delayed until Germany was reunited." In 1997, when the references I have were written, still to be paid, and WERE/ARE BEING SO(!), 10,2 millionen DM. (Now of course in Euros).
Also, it must be noted;
on 01/01/54 the USSR wrote off the debts of the DDR. Because of the Paris treaty 23/10/54, the reperations paid by the DFR were "written off". HOWEVER "Written off" is a misnomer NOW it is not called "reparations" HOWEVER we ARE paying "Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts" (Wiedergutmachung is...you guessed it REPARATIONS!) of the victims/damage done by national scialism (NOTE; SOCIALISTS!!!).
On top of that we paid for "Besatzungskosten", ie, those U.S, U.K and French troops that occupied us from 1945 to today. (So those that say we "got our defence for free" can go stuff themselves. WE paid for that defence to be here, we STILL pay!)
From 1953 to 1955 we gave the occupying forces; 1953, 5,593 billion DM, 54, 5,752 billion, and 55, 3,831 billion DM.
(All quotes from Wolfgang Popp "Wehe den Besiegten. Grabert Verlag 2000. pp 38,39,372 and chapter "Reparationen des Besiegten und zerstörten Deutschlands" pp 329 - 378)
It must also be noted, that we pay full pensions to ALL concentration camp survivors, no matter WHERE in the world they now are.
Sorry, where were we "Written of debts" I believe it was. Care to continue your theory?
@Sgt Troy 9.35
I agree with pretty much everything you say in this post. The British Army improved its performance in the last year of the war. But how stupid must the leadership have been after all that had happened in 1914-15 to not have developed any infantry tactics by the time of the Somme. And despite the terrific efforts of the RA later Im not sure that infantry tactics improved greatly. Casualties in the last 3 months of the war were enormous.
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